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MULTI-YEAR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
AND THE AFSCME/ STATE OF ILLINOIS DISPUTE
By, Tamara Cummings and John H. Kelly
Tamara Cummings serves as General Counsel to the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police, a large public
sector union representing law enforcement bargaining units. She has held that position since January,
2010. She has worked as an attorney for the Labor Council since 2003, and in this capacity she has
represented law enforcement officers and civilian employees in all areas of labor and employment
relations. She has acted as lead counsel in contract negotiations, grievance arbitrations, interest
arbitrations, discipline hearings and various court cases in circuit and appellate courts throughout the
State of Illinois.
Tamara has been responsible for organizing picket lines and civic protests. Tamara is involved in
member and employee training and has recently been the chief speaker at Labor Council Critical
Incident Seminars which have been held across the State and attended by union members, State’s
Attorneys, Chiefs of Police and County Sheriffs. Prior to joining the Labor Council, Tamara worked for
the Law Offices of Joseph V. Roddy where she primarily defended and represented Chicago Police
Officers in administrative, criminal and civil matters. She tried cases in the Cook County Law, Municipal
and Criminal Divisions as well as in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. She also prepared and argued appeals before the Illinois Appellate Courts, and the United
States Court of Appeals, both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits. Tamara received her Bachelor’s degree
from the University of Chicago and her Juris Doctor degree from Washington University in St. Louis,
Missouri.
John H. Kelly is a shareholder in the law firm of Ottosen Britz Kelly Cooper Gilbert and Dinolfo,
Ltd. With three (3) offices in northern Illinois, the firm concentrates its practice in the representation of
units of local government. John focuses his practice on management side employment and labor issues
and regularly advises police chiefs, fire chiefs and 911 center directors on the intricacies of personnel
and labor law.
Mr. Kelly has been a presenter at numerous national and state conferences including the Chicago Kent
Illinois Public Sector Labor Relations Law Conference. John Kelly is a graduate of the John Marshall
Law School and Northwestern University. He served 10 years as a suburban police officer and has been
a member of the Lake Zurich Fire and Police Commission for twenty (20) years.
Mr. Kelly acknowledges the assistance of his law clerk, Brian Gorka, a second year student at the John
Marshall Law School in the research and preparation of this article.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Public employers and unions representing public employees have negotiated
multi-year collective bargaining agreements for decades. The legal status and
viability of such agreements are at issue in pending litigation between AFSCME
Council 31 and the State of Illinois. This article will discuss the developments
leading to the litigation and what the outcome might mean for public employers,
unions, and collective bargaining in general. After presenting a brief history of the
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law governing multi-year collective bargaining agreements, we will
provide background to the litigation and the union and the employer perspectives
on the issues raised in those matters.
II.

HISTORY OF MULTI-YEAR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

Prior to the effective date of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act,[1] multi-year
collective bargaining agreements were considered null and void. The controlling
case for this proposition was Ligenza v. Round Lake Beach.[2]
In Ligenza, the parties (the Fraternal Order of Police and the Village of Round Lake
Beach) had entered into a collective bargaining agreement, executed on November
3, 1982 and effective through April 30, 1984. Under the agreement in question,
covered officers were to receive a 5 percent wage increase on May 1, 1983, and
another 5 percent increase on November 1, 1983. [3]
When the village failed to pay the May 1, 1983 wage increase, the union filed a
grievance. After numerous requests by the union to abide by the agreement,
village representatives finally notified the union that it did not consider itself
bound by the agreement. The union sued to compel arbitration and to enforce the
collective bargaining agreement.[4]
The court held that under Section 8-1-7 of the Illinois Municipal Code, the contract
was null and void. Section 8-1-7 provides:
No contract shall be made by the corporate authorities, or by any committee or member
thereof, and no expense shall be incurred by any of the officers or departments of any
municipality, whether the object of the expenditure has been ordered by the corporate
authorities or not, unless an appropriation has been previously made concerning that
contract or expense. Any contract made, or any expense otherwise incurred, in violation
of the provisions of this section shall be null and void as to the municipality, and no
money belonging thereto shall be paid on account thereof.[5]

Specifically, the court stated:
Under section 8-1-7…any contract made without a full prior appropriation is null and
void…Section 8-1-7 (and its statutory predecessors) has consistently been construed as
denying a municipality the power to contract, and thereby incur indebtedness, for a
period longer than one year, at least in the absence of an enabling statute authorizing such
a contract…Further, a party contracting with a city is presumed to know whether the city
is prohibited from making a contract, and a contract made in violation of section 8-1-7 is
void ab initio and cannot be enforced by estoppel or ratification . . . [6]

In July 1984, while Ligenza was pending before the court, the Illinois Legislature
enacted the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (“IPLRA”).[7] Section 21 of the
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IPLRA pertains to multi-year agreements and reads, in part: “Subject to the
appropriation power of the employer, employers and exclusive representatives
may negotiate multi-year collective bargaining agreements pursuant to the
provisions of this Act.”[8] Section 14(h), providing for interest arbitration for
police and firefighter contracts, lists, among the factors on which the arbitrator
shall base the award, “The lawful authority of the employer.”[9]
Although the Ligenza decision was issued on May 21, 1985, after the effective date
of the IPLRA, the dispute involved events that occurred before the IPLRA’s
enactment. Since the passage of the Act, thousands of multi-year agreements have
been negotiated or imposed through the interest arbitration process upon public
sector employers and unions.[10]. This includes nineteen multi-year contracts
between AFSCME and the State of Illinois.[11] However, since the passage of the
IPLRA in 1984, there have been no reported cases addressing Section 21 and, more
specifically, whether that Section was intended to address the validity of multi-year
collective bargaining agreements.[12] Pending litigation between the State of
Illinois and AFSCME Council 31 may have a serious impact on the future of multiyear agreements.
III.

STATE OF ILLINOIS AND AFSCME LITIGATION

AFCSME’s representation of State of Illinois employees pre-dates passage of the
IPLRA, spanning over approximately thirty-five years and nineteen multi-year
collective bargaining agreements in various bargaining units.[13]
A State of Illinois – AFSCME Master Agreement effective September 5, 2008
through June 30, 2012 provided for a total of 15.25 percent in wage
increases.[14] Within weeks of the signing of the Master Agreement, the stock
market crashed and the economy slid into what many refer to as the “Great
Recession.”[15]
In 2011, facing the prospect of massive layoffs, AFSCME entered into a series of
agreements with the State, totaling approximately $400,000,000.00 in
concessions.[16] The agreements, among other things, deferred certain wage
increases in exchange for guarantees from the State that there would be no layoffs
of AFSCME employees through June 30, 2012, and with limited exceptions, no
facility closures prior to July 1, 2012.[17] Arbitrator Edwin Benn was given
jurisdiction to resolve disputes that arose under the concession agreements. [18]
The concession agreements deferred until February 1, 2012, 2 percent of a 4
percent wage increase that, under the Master Agreement, was due on July 1,
2011. The other 2 percent increase remained due on July 1, 2011.[19] However,
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although the Governor originally submitted a budget to fund the 2 percent
increases, the General Assembly did not appropriate sufficient funds, [20] and the
State failed to pay approximately 30,000 employees the increase due on July 1,
2011.[21]
AFSCME grieved and in an award dated July 19, 2011, Arbitrator Benn ordered the
State to pay the 2 percent wage increase. Arbitrator Benn stated:
“The words “. . . shall be increased by 2.00 percent . . . ” leave nothing to imagination.
“[S]hall” is not discretionary. In simple dictionary terms, ”shall” means ”must; …obliged
to.” Under the mandatory, clear and simple terms of the negotiated language, the State
must pay the 2 percent wage increase effective July 1, 2011. As a matter of contract, the
State has no choice.”[22]

Arbitrator Benn declined to consider the State’s arguments that, under Section 21
of the IPLRA and the Illinois Constitution, it was not obligated to pay because the
General Assembly did not appropriate sufficient money to fund the wage
increases. Deferring those arguments to the courts, Arbitrator Benn quoted from
the U. S. Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining
agreement . . . Thus the arbitrator has authority to resolve only questions
of contractual rights . . .
[T]he specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the
shop, not the law of the land . . . [T]he resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is
a primary responsibility of courts . . .[23]
Arbitrator Benn concluded:
Section 21 of the IPLRA is a statutory provision. The parties did not specifically make
Section 21 part of the Agreement or the Cost Savings Agreements. As an arbitrator, I
therefore have no authority to interpret that statutory provision. Statutory
interpretations must be made by the courts and not by arbitrators.[24]

With respect to the State’s constitutional argument, Arbitrator Benn reached a
similar conclusion. He wrote, “Like the State’s statutory arguments, in my
capacity as an arbitrator under the Agreement, the State’s Constitutional
arguments are therefore not for me to decide.” [25]
Notwithstanding the no layoff/no facility closure commitments in the concession
agreements, on September 8, 2011, the State announced that because of
insufficient appropriations by the General Assembly, it would close seven mental
health and correctional facilities and, prior to July 1, 2012, lay off approximately
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2,000 employees, of whom 1,680 were covered by AFSCME
contracts.[26] Arbitrator Benn heard this matter as well and in an award dated
October 4, 2011, he blocked the layoffs and facility closures prior to July 1,
2012.[27] Arbitrator Benn stated:
In Cost Savings Agreements effective September 24, 2010 and November 3, 2010, the
State agreed that employees represented by the Union would not be laid off through June
30, 2012, nor would facilities be closed prior to July 1, 2012. The State is now laying off
employees and closing facilities prior to those dates. The State therefore did not live up
to its contractual promises. Pure and simple and as a matter of contract, the State violated
its no layoff/no facility closure promises found in the Cost Savings Agreements.[28]

Arbitrator Benn’s remedy included:
1. Should adversely impacted employees represented by the Union lose their
insurance or incur medical expenses which would otherwise have been paid for
or covered by insurance (for themselves or covered family members,
dependents or beneficiaries, including life insurance benefits) had they not been
laid off, as part of the make whole remedy, those employees shall be further
compensated by the State for those losses in addition to reinstatement and lost
wages and benefits.
2. Should adversely impacted employees represented by the Union lose their
homes, cars or are forced to move from their residences as a result of the State’s
clear violations of the Cost Savings Agreements which place those employees in
positions of being unable to make timely payments on those items, or should
those employees suffer any other related losses due to the State’s violation of
the Cost Savings Agreements caused by the improper layoffs, then as part of the
make whole remedy, in addition to reinstatement and lost wages and benefits,
those employees shall be compensated by the State for those additional
losses. [29]
As in the Wage Increases decision, Arbitrator Benn rejected the State’s Section 21
and Constitutional arguments because he considered them outside of his
contractual jurisdiction.[30] Multiple court actions are pending, in state[31] and
federal courts.[32]
Bilateral negotiations are the cornerstone of collective bargaining. These cases
raise several issues, and theoutcome of the litigation may seriously impact the way
public employers and unions handle multi-year collective bargaining agreements
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in negotiations. The next sections will discuss these issues, first from a union and
then from a public employer perspective.
IV.

UNION PERSPECTIVES

A.

The State Did Not Violate The Labor Agreements When The General Assembly Did
Not Appropriate Funds for Those Labor Agreements

As ruled by the Arbitrator, the State of Illinois violated the clear and unequivocal
language set forth in the parties’ agreements when it failed to pay the 2 percent
wage increase due on July 1, 2011, and ordered the closure of State facilities prior
to July 1, 2012. Nothing in those agreements made the State’s obligations
contingent upon legislative appropriations or upon the State receiving a certain
sum in revenue. The State’s defense relies on the IPLRA and the Illinois
Constitution, urging that its contractual obligations did not arise because the
General Assembly did not appropriate sufficient funds.
The IPLRA

Section 7 of the IPLRA imposes a duty to bargain on AFSCME and the State of
Illinois. It provides:
A public employer and the exclusive representative have the authority and the duty to
bargain collectively set forth in this Section…. “to bargain collectively” means the
performance of the mutual obligation of the public employer or his designated
representative and the representative of the public employees to meet at reasonable
times, including meetings in advance of the budget-making process . . . . [33]

AFSCME and the State entered into a Master Agreement. The requirement that the
parties meet in advance of the budget-making process ensures that they produce
an agreement consistent with any budgetary constraints. Thus, when the State
became aware of budgetary shortfalls, the parties met again and entered into
concession agreements that saved the State hundreds of millions of dollars and
prevented layoffs and facility closures.
Section 7 further provides, “The duty ‘to bargain collectively’ shall also mean that
no party to a collective bargaining contract shall terminate or modify such contract,
unless [specific actions are taken].”[34] It does not allow for the unilateral
termination or modification of the terms of an agreement, which is exactly what
the State did when it ignored its obligations under the concession agreements. The
detailed negotiation process envisioned in Section 7 would be meaningless if, after
the parties have met and negotiated a binding contract, the State could single
handedly renege on its obligations simply because the legislative body chooses not
to appropriate sufficient funds.
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The State’s actions also run afoul of Section 3(o) of the IPLRA. Section 3(o) defines
public employer to include “the State of Illinois . . . and any person acting within
the scope of his or her authority, express or implied, on behalf of those entities in
dealing with its employees,” but to “not mean and shall not include the
General Assembly of the State of Illinois . . . .”[35]
The State of Illinois is the public employer and the Governor is its agent. The
collective bargaining agreements entered into by agents acting on behalf of
employers are binding on those employers, even when they require an expenditure
of funds.[36] An employer who accepts the benefits of a collective bargaining
agreement ratifies the agreement and makes it binding.[37]
AFSCME and the State, acting through the Governor, entered into agreements that
included wage increases and other terms in exchange for hundreds of millions of
dollars in concessions. These agreements are binding on the State which includes
both the Governor and the General Assembly. The State accepted the benefits of
those agreements and employees continued to work under the terms of the
agreements, and under Section 7, the State may not unilaterally modify or
terminate them. Its failure to pay the wage increases and its going forward with
layoffs and facility closures clearly violated the agreements. Because Section 3(o)
expressly excludes the General Assembly from the definition of public employer,
the actions of the General Assembly are not binding upon the parties and cannot
serve as a basis for releasing the State of its contractual obligations.
The State’s reliance on Section 21 of the IPLRA is contrary to the provision’s plain
language. The provision refers to the appropriations power of the Employer, not
the actual appropriations bills enacted annually. In other words, the language
means multi-year collective bargaining agreements are not intended to impact
whatever appropriations authority exists under state or local law.
Section 21 does not say that multi-year collective bargaining agreements are
invalid unless they are subject to appropriations. It also does not say that multiyear agreements must be approved by the General Assembly.
The State’s interpretation of Section 21 is illogical in light of the legislative history
of the IPLRA. The dispute in Ligenza v. Village of Round Lake Beach over the
validity of multi-year collective bargaining agreements arose in May 1983, as the
General Assembly was considering Senate Bill 536, a precursor to the
IPLRA.[38] The Senate version of the Act was debated and passed out of the Senate
on May 25, 1983 and did not contain Section 21.[39] Section 21 was proposed by
Representative Greiman when the House debated the bill on June 23 and 24,
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1983.[40] While there was no discussion of Section 21, given the status of
the Ligenza case at that time, it is probable that Section 21 was added in direct
response to the Village’s claim that multi-year areements were null and void.[41]
Section 15 of the IPLRA provides:
(a) In case of any conflict between the provisions of this Act and any other law . . .
executive order or administrative regulation relating to wages, hours and
conditions of employment and employment relations, the provisions of this Act or
any collective bargaining agreement negotiated thereunder shall prevail and
control
.
.
.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) above, any collective bargaining contract
between a public employer and a labor organization executed pursuant to this Act
shall supersede any contrary statutes, charters, ordinances, rules or regulations
relating to wages, hours and conditions of employment and employment relations
adopted by the public employer or its agents . . .
(c) It is the public policy of this State, pursuant to paragraphs (h) and (i) of Section
6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution, that the provisions of this Act are the
exclusive exercise by the State of powers and functions which might otherwise be
exercised concurrently by home rule units. Such powers and functions may not be
exercised concurrently, either directly or indirectly, by any unit of local
government, including any home rule unit, except as otherwise authorized by this
act.
To the extent that the Illinois General Assembly passed an appropriations bill
inconsistent with the Agreements entered into by the parties, or the State
promulgated rules negating the agreements, under Section 15, the agreements and
not the bill or rules should control.
Multi-year agreements ensure certainty and labor stability and thousands of multiyear contracts have been adopted since the enactment of the IPLRA, including
contracts with the State of Illinois. The General Assembly is not a public employer
and therefore not a party to the agreements. Thus, the General Assembly does not
have to act for a contract to be binding upon the State. It may not accept or reject
the terms of an agreement. To suggest that the General Assembly has the power to
obliterate an agreement simply by failing to appropriate funds after a binding
contract has been established defies the entire scheme of the IPLRA as well as its
goal of labor peace.
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The Illinois Constitution

The Illinois Constitution provides:
Article II, §1: “[t]he legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate.
No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.”[42]
Article VIII, §1(b): “[t]he State…shall…incur obligations for payment or
make payments from public funds only as authorized by law . . ”[43]
Article VIII, §2(a): “[t]he Governor shall prepare and submit to the General
Assembly…a State budget for the ensuing fiscal year…Proposed expenditures
shall not exceed funds estimated to be available for the fiscal year as shown
in the budget.”[44]
Article VIII, §2(b): ‘[t]he General Assembly by law shall make appropriations
for all expenditures of public funds by the State. Appropriations for a fiscal
year shall not exceed funds estimated by the General Assembly to be
available during that year.”[45]
Article II of the Constitution describes the separation of powers among the three
branches of government. Article VIII, Sections 2(a) and 2(b) describe the
obligations of the Governor and the General Assembly with respect to the
budgetary process. These provisions contemplate the two branches working
together to produce a balanced budget. Under Section 2(a), the Governor must
submit to the General Assembly a balanced budget, with proposed expenditures
not to exceed projected revenues. Similarly, according to Section 2(b), the General
Assembly must enact a budget where the actual appropriations do not exceed
estimated revenues. The State contends that the Governor, exceeded his
constitutional powers when he incurred financial obligations even though the
legislature did not appropriate sufficient funds to fulfill those obligations,
violating Article VIII, Sections 2(a) and 2(b). However, when the parties
negotiated concession agreements, they were cognizant of these constitutional
limitations and the agreements saved the State approximately $400,000.000.00
— $300,000,000.00 in FY 2011 and an additional $100,000,000.00 in FY
2012.[46]
Contrary to the State’s claims, abiding by these agreements will not violate the
separation of powers clause or Article VIII, Sections 2(a) and 2(b). Under Section
2(a), the Governor must submit a balanced budget to the General Assembly. There
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has been no assertion that the Governor submitted a budget that exceeded his
limitations under this section.[47] On the contrary, the State conceded that the
Governor requested sufficient appropriations to allow it to honor the agreements
and even stated in a July 2011 Department of Central Management Services’
memo:
The Governor’s proposed budget to the General Assembly sought to fully fund all
collective bargaining contracts. However, the budget that was passed by the General
Assembly and sent to the Governor does not contain appropriation authority . . . .[48]

Similarly, Section 2(b) requires that the General Assembly’s appropriations for
expenditures not to exceed the funds available. As with Section 2(a), the State did
not take the position that honoring the agreements would cause expenditures to
exceed revenues for the 2012 fiscal year.[49] The State conceded that at the time
the Governor signed the budget bills passed by the General Assembly, he exercised
his constitutional authority to make reductions and line item vetoes of $376
million contained in those bills.[50] The amendatory vetoes and reductions
created enough space in the budget for the State to meet the agreement’s
obligations and the State did not argue that the award would require the General
Assembly’s appropriations to exceed estimated revenue.[51] In other words, the
agreements did not require the State to spend money it did not have; they only
required the State to spend or appropriate the money differently.
The State has asserted that abiding by the agreements would require it to incur an
obligation for which legislative appropriation is insufficient and therefore would
violate Article VIII, Section 1(b) because the obligation is not “authorized by
law.”[52] However, during the litigation, the State never argued that the
appropriations for the 2012 fiscal year were insufficient to satisfy its
obligations.[53] Even if the State did not appropriate sufficient funds to certain
departments to satisfy the agreements, nothing prevented the Governor and the
General Assembly from working together to ensure that the State would meet its
contractual obligations as contemplated by the Illinois Constitution.[54] This
occurs every year through the enactment of supplemental appropriations
bills.[55] To the extent that the General Assembly did not make sufficient
appropriations to satisfy the terms of the agreements, it was incumbent upon them
to work together on a supplemental appropriations bill to ensure that the State
satisfied its contractual obligations.
3.

The Equal Protection and Contracts Clauses

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and the Seventh Circuit
have rejected AFSCME’s arguments that the State violated the Equal Protection
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Clause and Contracts Clause of the U. S. Constitution. Therefore, this Section will
briefly address the courts’ rulings on these issues.
In an amended complaint filed in the U.S. District Court on July 20, 2011, AFSCME
alleged that the State was liable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 because it impaired
a contract in violation of Article I of the Constitution and violated AFSCMErepresented
employees’
Fourteenth
Amendment
right
to
equal
protection.[56] AFSCME also asserted equal protection and breach of contract
violations under Illinois law[57]. The District Court denied AFSCME’s motion for
injunctive relief and granted the State’s motion to dismiss and AFSCME
appealed.[58]
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the court’s denial of injunctive relief and upheld the
District Court’s holding that the State’s Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
barred AFSCME from obtaining relief under its Contracts Clause claim.[59] The
Seventh Circuit further held that AFSCME failed to state a cognizable Contracts
Clause claim.[60]
The Contracts Clause of the U. S. Constitution, provides, “No [s]tate shall….pass
“any… [l]aw impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . . ”[61] The Seventh Circuit
explained that to prevail on a Contracts Clause claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that “a change in state law has operated as a substantial impairment of a
contractual relationship.”[62] This requires plaintiff to show: “(1) that there is a
contractual relationship; (2) that a change in law has impaired that relationship;
and (3) that the impairment is substantial.”[63] The court held that because the
State’s Rules which implemented the wage freeze did not foreclose a remedy for
breach of contract, no impairment of a contractual obligation existed and AFSCME
failed to state a cognizable claim.[64]
With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause Claim, the
court applied a “rational relationship” test because AFSCME’s members were not
a suspect classification and the case did not involve the exercise of a fundamental
right.[65]. Under that test, the government regulation will be upheld if “there is a
rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate
government purpose.” [66] In upholding the dismissal of AFSCME’s claim, the
court explained that instituting cost-savings measures is a legitimate
governmental interest, particularly for a government in such dire financial
straits.[67]
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Conclusion

Despite having negotiated multi-year collective bargaining agreements with
AFSCME since 1975, and for long periods of time with other unions as well, the
State now has taken the position that it does not have to pay agreed upon wage
increases and other economic benefits because those agreements are contingent
upon sufficient appropriations from the General Assembly. If the State prevails on
any of its claims, the decision will have serious ramifications for the future of public
sector bargaining. Multi-year collective bargaining agreements bring stability to
the parties and to the public. Such agreements lay out each party’s obligations over
a period of years and allow public sector employers to plan for the anticipated costs
of wages and benefits so that they can budget accordingly. It is unlikely that unions
would ever agree to multi-year agreements in the future or that interest arbitrators
will award any more than one year agreements. If economic offers made by a public
employer are contingent upon subsequent appropriations, any obligations
incurred in outgoing years would be meaningless.
As a result, parties will be negotiating agreements every year and gone will be the
usual three to five year agreements which have historically resulted in labor peace
and stability as intended by the IPLRA. Furthermore, some contracts take years to
negotiate, and the result will be chaotic and costly as public sector employers and
unions will have to repeat the time consuming and laborious collective bargaining
process on a yearly basis. Some unions have thousands of members spanning
hundreds of separate units, each with separate agreements. In all likelihood, some
of these unions will be physically unable to dedicate the labor and the money
necessary to renegotiate all of its agreements on an annual basis. In sum, if the
State is correct that negotiated economic benefits are contingent upon subsequent
appropriations, multi-year agreements and public sector collective bargaining as
we know it will be dead.
V.

EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVES

A.
The State Did Not Violate The Labor Agreements When The General Assembly
Did Not Appropriate Funds for Those Labor Agreements

An arbitrator must base his decision solely on the terms of the parties’ collective
bargaining agreement. The particular contract terms at issue in the AFSCME-State
dispute entitled the union to the re-negotiated wage increases and the no-layoffprotection. However, when constitutional and statutory issues arise, the arbitrator
must defer judgment to the law and the courts. Even Arbitrator Benn
acknowledged these limitations.[68] Therefore, the courts become the proper
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venue to settle these issues, and it is improper to rely solely on the decision of an
arbitrator with limited authority.
1.

The IPLRA

The Union Perspectives Section of this Article urges that no party to a collective
bargaining agreement may unilaterally terminate or modify that agreement. This
argument ignores the language of Section 7 of the IPLRA:
No party to a collective bargaining contract shall terminate or modify such contract,
unless the party desiring such termination or modification:
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed
termination or modification 60 days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event
such contract contains no expiration date, 60 days prior to the time it is proposed to make
such termination or modification
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new
contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Board within 30 days after such notice of the existence of a dispute
provided no agreement has been reached by that time; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms
and conditions of the existing contact for a period of 60 days after such notice is given to
the other party or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever comes later.[69]

When a labor agreement has an expiration date, a party wishing to terminate the
agreement must serve notice to the other party sixty days before that agreement
expires. The party wishing to terminate also should offer to meet and confer for the
purpose of negotiation, notify the Illinois Labor Relations Board, and continue to
honor the terms of the contract until the contract expires. While the process laid
out by the statute is neither simple, nor timely, it allows one party to unilaterally
terminate, or more likely modify, a labor contract, at or after its expiration date,
while still honoring much of the agreement.
The State of Illinois, including any person acting on its behalf, is a public employer
but the General Assembly is not.[70] Relying upon this definition, the Union
Perspectives urges that the actions of the General Assembly cannot bind the parties
to a labor agreement as would the actions of the Governor, because the statute
excludes the General Assembly as a public employer.
The State of Illinois is a party to the AFSCME collective bargaining agreement, and
therefore is a public employer. One cannot simply separate the duties and
responsibilities of General Assembly from the State of Illinois. While this particular

16

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

2012

statute may exempt the General Assembly as its own individual “pubic employer”
or “employer,” it does not suggest exempting the General Assembly from its
constitutional duty to the State of Illinois. One such duty includes providing
appropriations for programs or agreements entered into by the Governor, and it is
the responsibility of the General Assembly to uphold this duty.[71]
The Union Perspectives also relies on City of Burbank v. Illinois State Labor
Relations Board, which held that once an agent of the government enters into an
agreement, the legislature is bound by those actions.[72], However, later Illinois
cases questioned and rejected the reasoning in City of Burbank, especially where
the agent did not have authority, nor communicate his dealings to a legislative
body.[73]
The State’s obligations to its unions are contingent on General Assembly
appropriations. Support for this argument can be found in Section 21 of the IPLRA
which authorizes multi-year collective bargaining agreements “[s]ubject to the
appropriation power of the employer.”[74] The Union Perspectives suggests that
once an employer has appropriations power, it may enter into a multi-year
collective bargaining agreement and be bound by the terms of that agreement. The
union view goes so far as to suggest multi-year contracts are “not intended to
impact whatever appropriations authority exists under State or local law.”
The Union Perspectives also argues that the amendment of Section 21 evidences
the fact that Section 21, as initially written, did not limit the power to enter into
contracts “subject to appropriation.” However, another reading of these
amendments is that the legislature was clarifying the statute and emphasizing the
appropriations authority.
This suggestion is, however, precisely what the General Assembly seeks to prevent.
Once locked into a multi-year labor agreement, how could the State’s
appropriations authority not be impacted? The Union Perspectives asks the courts
to force the State to make appropriations, impacting the General Assembly’s
constitutional authority to make such appropriations on its own. A plain
interpretation of this statute leads to an understanding that the power to
appropriate must control the spending authority of government, whether local or
state. This maxim extends even to the negotiation of collective bargaining
agreements. In difficult economic times, government can only spend the money it
has, labor contracts notwithstanding.
The Union Perspectives argues that in a conflict between the collective bargaining
agreement and any law related to wages, hours, or terms of employment that the
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terms of the labor contract must prevail. In the union view, under IPLRA sections
15(a) and (b), a labor contract supersedes any law, ordinance, or statute related to
wages, hours and terms of employment.[75] This statute does not grant a collective
bargaining agreement the power to supersede a general appropriations bill enacted
by the General Assembly. It only supersedes those laws regulating wages and
workplace conditions. To interpret otherwise would allow a collective bargaining
agreement to operate above any other law or action taken by the State of Illinois.
The union interpretation is too broad, especially in light of the public policy
exception to the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. This section of
the statute does not suggest the IPLRA controls when in conflict with the public
policy of the State.[76] If a court accepts the union interpretation, IPLRA section
15 would swallow the public-policy exception, because, no matter how offensive to
public policy an arbitrator’s decision is, the arbitrator’s decision would
stand.[77]. Considering the public-policy exception has been cited and applied by
Illinois courts since the Labor Act’s inception, it would be improper to read section
15 so broadly.[78]
2.

The Illinois Constitution

If the State of Illinois, through the office of the Governor, abides by the collective
bargaining agreements and wage awards and ignores the lack of General Assembly
appropriations, the Governor will have violated the Illinois Constitution’s
separation of powers clause.[79] In the union view, since the Governor submitted
his budget with the labor contract wage increases included, and the General
Assembly decided not to fund the increases, the Governor should somehow fund
the increases anyway. The Union Perspectives argues that because he exercised his
amendatory veto power to cut other expenditures from the budget, the Governor
could have included the labor contract wage increase and still been within the
authorized appropriation. To accept the union position would make the Governor’s
actions ultra vires, because only the General Assembly shall make appropriations
for all expenditures of public funds by the State.[80].
As a public employer, the State of Illinois may honor the terms of any collective
bargaining agreement, only when authorized by law. “The State…shall incur
obligations for payment or make payments from public funds only as authorized
by law or ordinance.”[81] In this situation, the General Assembly did not approve
an appropriations bill which would have allowed the State to comply with the
Governor’s re-negotiated collective bargaining agreement terms. Therefore, the
Illinois Constitution bars any payment of public funds for the labor contract or the
wage awards.
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Conclusion

One of the stated purposes of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act is to protect
the public health and safety of the citizens of Illinois.[82] All Illinois citizens,
whether as members of a union, as taxpayers, or as voters, are party to the
collective bargaining agreements entered into by the State and other public
employers. Responsible spending of the State’s budgetary resources protects the
public health and promotes the safety of all Illinois citizens, even when the
ramifications may disadvantage individual union members. Section 2 of the IPLRA
states that one of the purposes of the Act is to “regulate labor relations between
public employers and employees.”[83] While all those involved in contract
negotiations may agree that multi-year collective bargaining agreements promote
labor stability in the public sector, economic conditions may exist that mitigate
against the feasibility of these agreements. The State of Illinois, and other public
employers, have found themselves in this type of situation over the last few years.
Public labor contracts, like all governmental obligations, must be subject to the
appropriation and spending powers of the government.
VI.

WHAT LIES AHEAD

While the authors were writing this article, the Circuit Court of Cook County issued
a decision. In ruling from the bench on July 2, 2012, the court remanded the matter
back to Arbitrator Benn, telling him to take additional evidence on the
appropriated funds available to the State. The court issued a follow-up written
ruling on July 9, 2012.[84]
The court’s reasoning stemmed from the public policy defense raised by the State
as well as the language contained in Section 21 of the ILPRA. The Court
interpreted Section 21 to mean that:
“the payment obligations for the wage increases in the CBA/CSA [collective bargaining
agreement/cost savings agreement]are subject to the appropriations power of the
employer. The Office of the Governor lacks power to appropriate funds to the ten agencies
so that the salaries, wage or wage increases can be paid. Plaintiff cannot pay the wage
increases unless the General Assembly that has the appropriations power appropriates
public funds to the 10 agencies to allow them for plaintiff to do so.”[85]

The Court found “ a well defined and dominant public policy . . . that the plaintiff
cannot spend public funds for the Wage Increases without sufficient appropriation
by the General Assembly to do so.”[86] The court explained that the burden was
on the State to prove that its public policy defense applied, that is whether funds
appropriated were insufficient to pay the wage increases.[87] The Court remanded
the matter to Arbitrator Benn for further proceedings to allow the plaintiff to try to
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establish its public policy defense by showing a lack of necessary appropriated
funds.[88]
Thus, the outcome of the dispute and its impact on multi-year contracts and
collective bargaining remains to be seen. However, one must ask whether the court
ruled appropriately or prudently by applying the public policy exception as it did
and remanding the matter back to the arbitrator.
The limited role of the arbitrator has been established by the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Court has stated that “an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and
application of the collective bargaining agreement.”[89] Furthermore, “the
specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not
the law of the land . . . the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a
primary responsibility of courts.”[90]
In the AFSCME/State of Illinois litigation, arguably, the court avoided its
responsibility to resolve the important statutory and constitutional issues raised
by the parties by remanding the matter back to Arbitrator Benn, and instructing
him to take public policy considerations into account. The public policy defense
was raised during the initial proceedings before the arbitrator, and he correctly
refused to consider the argument. The CBA/CSA at issue did not contain language
regarding public policy and a resolution of the public policy issue was a matter for
the court and not the arbitrator to decide.
Arbitrator Benn reiterated his view that he lacks authority to consider the public
policy defense. On July 16, 012, he declined the remand, reasoning, “Whether the
narrow question remanded is a factual one or not, it remains a question going to
application of public policy to this dispute.”[91] Arbitrator Benn related that the
parties represented that they would work cooperatively to develop a sufficient
record for the court to proceed.[92]
Although the Court did not go so far as ordering that the State can avoid its
contractual obligation to pay wage increases, its mandate that Arbitrator Benn
make a public policy ruling second guesses not only the manner in which the
arbitrator conducted his hearing but also the historical limited role of the
arbitrator. Further, if the reasoning of the court is upheld, namely, that the State
cannot spend funds that have not been appropriated, then, as described in the
Union’s perspectives section of this article, multi-year agreements and collective
bargaining as we know them will no longer exist.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By, Student Editorial Board
Karina Fruin, Daniel Quist, Ryan Thoma, and Daniel Zapata
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations
Report. It highlights recent developments of interest to the public employment
relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the collective
bargaining statutes and the U.S. Constitution.
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Bargaining Units

In Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois and Service Employees
International Union, Local 73, Case No. 2011-RS-0018-C (IELRB 2012), the
IELRB granted SEIU’s petition to add several positions to the
clerical/administrative bargaining unit that SEIU represents at the University of
Illinois. The IELRB allowed the addition of several new positions to the historical
unit, including Chief Clerk, Collection Specialist and Customer Service
Representative.
The university opposed the certification and contested the petition on the ground
that the proposed bargaining unit was not appropriate under the IELRB’s rules for
presumptively appropriate bargaining units. The IELRB agreed that the
bargaining unit was not presumptively appropriate under its rules, but reasoned
that this did not preclude the unit from certification. The IELRB cited Board of
Trustees of the University of Illinois, 7 PERI 1011 (IELRB 1990), where the IELRB
allowed certain building service employees at the university to be included in the
historical bargaining unit of housing maintenance inspectors even though the
resulting unit would not qualify as presumptively appropriate under the IELRB’s
rules. The IELRB certified thepetition mainly because the addition of the building
service employees to the existing unit would help prevent the future proliferation
of bargaining units.
In the present case, the university contended that SEIU had not put forth clear and
convincing evidence that the bargaining unit should be certified. Under the
IELRB’s rules, when a bargaining unit is not presumptively appropriate the burden
shifts to the union to show by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the
“establishment of a different unit [would] not cause undue fragmentation . . . or
proliferation of bargaining units;” (2) that “special circumstances and compelling
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justifications” existed to warrant the certification of a bargaining unit other than
those set forth in the IELRB’s rules; and (3) that the unit was otherwise appropriate
under Section 7 of the IELRA.
The IELRB reasoned that the addition of extra clerical employees to an existing
unit of clerical employees is the polar opposite of bargaining unit “fragmentation
or proliferation.” The IELRB held that the union had proven all the factors that
constituted “compelling justifications” for certification. The IELRB found that
SEIU was seeking an extension of the natural bargaining unit rather than trying to
change the character of the bargaining unit, that no other petitions were pending
that sought to include the at issue employees in other bargaining units, and that
there was no bargaining history that would lead the IELRB to think that the
inclusion of the new employees would create instability.
The IELRB reasoned that the unit was otherwise appropriate under Section 7 of
the IELRA. The Board noted that the union had a history of adding similar types
of clerical and administrative employees to the bargaining unit, and that the
petitioned-for employees had a similar community of interest with the currently
represented employees.
The university further argued that the petition was not proper because the
proposed bargaining unit omitted a number of clerical/administrative positions
that should otherwise be included in the unit. The IELRB, relying on two Illinois
Appellate Court opinions, stated that a proposed unit need not be the most
appropriate unit to be certified, but that the bargaining unit must be appropriate
under the Act and not “artificial or arbitrary.”
II.

IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Duty of Fair Representation

In Michels v. ILRB, 969 N.E.2d 996 (Ill.App. 4th Dist. 2012), the Appellate Court
for the Fourth District affirmed the ILRB State Panel’s decision upholding its
Executive Director’s dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge alleging that a
union breached its duty of fair representation.
Michels was employed as a parole agent with the Illinois Department of
Corrections. On May 20, 2008, he was discharged for various acts of misconduct
involving several parolees, including excessive use of force, socializing with
committed persons, trafficking, filing false reports, verbal and physical harassment
of parolees, and various civil rights violations. The union grieved the discharge but
informed Michels that it was not going to pursue his grievance to arbitration.
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The court affirmed the ILRB dismissal of Michels’ unfair labor practice charge that
the union violated its duty of fair representation. Michels argued that he raised
sufficient facts to warrant issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint against
the union. The court stated that the IPLRA requires the ILRB to exercise its
discretion when determining whether there is enough evidence to justify a
hearing. The court also noted that the ILRB will dismiss a charge if the charge fails
to state a claim on its face or the investigation reveals no issue of law or fact
sufficient to warrant a hearing. The court further stated the ILRB abuses its
discretion only where its decision to dismiss the charge is clearly illogical. Thus,
the court found that Michels had to establish that no reasonable person could
possibly take the ILRB’s view.
The court noted that a union commits an unfair labor practice and violates its duty
of fair representation if it commits intentional misconduct in representing an
employee. The court further noted that “to establish intentional misconduct, the
charging party must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the union’s
conduct was intentional and directed at the charging party and (2) the intentional
action occurred because of and in retaliation for some past activity between the
employee and the union’s representative.” The court noted that the second
element of intentional misconduct requires the charging party to prove unlawful
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence showing: “(1) the employee
engaged in activities tending to engender the animosity of union agents, (2) the
union was aware of the employee’s activities, (3) the union undertook an adverse
representation action, and (4) the union took an adverse action against the
employee for discriminatory reasons.” The Court found that Michels failed to
submit any evidence to support his argument that the union’s decision to not
pursue his grievance to arbitration was intentional, invidious, and directed at him
in retaliation for some past activity. Further, the court noted that Michels failed to
provide evidence that the union harbored any animosity toward him. Thus, the
court found that the ILRB did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charge
against the union.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Affordable Care Act

In National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Health and
Human Services, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. §5000A, et seq. (ACA)
requirement that individuals obtain health insurance or pay a penalty is
constitutional but its requirement that states expand Medicaid to all citizens with
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incomes below 133 percent of the poverty level or lose all Medicaid funding is
unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, considered three possible sources of
congressional authority to enact the individual mandate: (1) the power to regulate
interstate commerce including the channels of commerce, people and things
involved in interstate commerce, and activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce, (2) the Necessary and Proper Clause, and (3) the power to tax.
According to Chief Justice Roberts, for the act to fall under Congress’ interstate
commerce power, its provisions must regulate an already existing commercial
activity because the power to regulate implies an existing activity that needs
regulation. However, the ACA requires individuals to enter into a new area of
commerce. It evokes an act; it does not regulate an act previously evoked. Chief
Justice Roberts stated in upholding the ACA’s individual mandate under Congress’
power to regulate interstate commerce would extend that power to a new area that
compels commerce, and that extends the power too far because the federal
government has the power to regulate activities, but the power to regulate
individuals is reserved to the states.
Chief Justice Roberts also found the ACA deficient under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. He reasoned that the Necessary and Proper Clause extends Congress’ reach
in areas that are already included within an enumerated power. It is not a means
to reach over the boundaries the Constitution places on the federal government. In
order for the Necessary and Proper Clause to apply, the act of buying
insurance must have already existed.
Chief Justice Roberts, however, found the individual mandate constitutional under
Congress’ taxing power. He observed that the ACA may be upheld under the power
to tax if the payment individuals without insurance are required to pay could be
considered a tax, and not a penalty.
Chief Justice Roberts, focused his analysis on whether the payment acts more like
a tax or more like a penalty. The ACA gives the IRS the power to determine who
must pay the fine, and to collect the fine, in the same fashion it calculates and
collects other tax penalties. However, the ACA does not permit the IRS to use its
typical enforcement mechanisms, such as criminal prosecutions and tax levies, and
says certain individuals, such as those at certain income levels, don’t have to pay
the penalty. The fine also does not have the severity of a penalty because it is not
so cumbersome that it compels the purchase of insurance, and, like most penalties,
the payment of the fine is not limited to willful violations. It is not uncommon for
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the federal government to tax activities it wants to discourage at a higher rate. The
IRS also collects the fine in the fashion that it collects taxes.
Chief Justice Roberts found that the wording of the ACA does not require it to be
construed as punishing law breakers, but may be read as taxing those without
insurance who are also not eligible for an exemption. He determined that the fine
may be reasonably construed to be a tax instead of a penalty. Accordingly, he
concluded that Congress has the power to enact the individual mandate. Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan and Sotomayor concurred that the individual mandate
was a valid exercise of Congress’ taxing power, but also would have upheld it under
the Commerce power and the Necessary and Paper Clauses. Justices Alito,
Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas dissented. They agreed with Chief Justice Roberts
that Congress lacked authority under its commerce powers and the Necessary and
Proper Clause, and argued that the penalty was not a tax and would have declared
the ACA unconstitutional.
With respect to the expansion of Medicaid, Chief Justice Roberts focused
his inquiry on whether Congress had power to both grant funds to states and
withhold funds to non-compliant states under its spending power. The spending
power permits the federal government and states to work together in spending
programs. Chief Justice Roberts relied on College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education, 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999), holding that
Congress may condition its offers of funds to the states on compliance with certain
demands. He cited Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
1, 17 (1981), for the assertion that the state must voluntarily enter into the
arrangement with the federal government, and not be coerced into compliance
with a program. Relying on South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987), he
maintained that if the federal government is exerting pressure on a state by
threatening to withdraw funds to a point such that it creates compulsory
compliance, it has overstepped the boundaries of federalism. The Necessary and
Proper Clause gives Congress much latitude in exercising its enumerated powers,
but the Court must not disrespect the constraints on federal power that the U.S.
Constitution intended.
The Court determined that the new requirement that Medicaid be offered to
anyone with an income below 133 percent of the poverty level, with a level of
benefits equal to the minimum requirements of the individual mandate, was a
dramatic shift in the Medicaid program because it created a new tier of
beneficiaries. The new requirement exceeded the mere alteration authorized, in
the prior statutory scheme and states could not have envisioned such a
scenario. Therefore, the Court saw the threat of the loss of all Medicaid funding as
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rising to the level of coercion. Chief Justice Roberts found the threat of
withholding funds to be incompatible with the Spending Clause.
IV.

FAIR SHARE FEES

In Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 132 S.Ct. 2277
(2012), the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits a publicsector union from requiring objecting non-members to pay a special fee for the
purpose of funding a union’s political and ideological activities unless they
affirmatively agree to do so.
The case arose from a dispute between public-sector employees in California and
SEIU Local 1000. California law permits public-sector employees in a bargaining
unit to create an “agency shop” arrangement through a majority vote under which
all employees are represented by the majority-selected union. Employees within
the union are not required to join, but non-members are still required to pay the
union an annual fee covering the cost of union services related to collective
bargaining.
In prior decisions, the Court held that public-sector unions could not require nonmembers to fund their political and ideological projects, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and established procedural requirements for how unions
can collect fees from non-members, Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U. S.
292 (1986). Under Hudson, unions are required to send out an annual notice
setting monthly dues for the year and establishing the percentage of dues dedicated
to collective bargaining activity. Non-member employees have a set period of time
to object to paying the full amount of dues after the notice is received and must
inform the union if they will only cover the fees related to collective bargaining.
In Knox, SEIU Local 1000 sent out its notice in June 2005 informing employees of
the fees for the coming year. The collective bargaining related fees were set at 56.35
perecent of the total amount of dues and non-members were given thirty days to
object to paying the entire amount. The notice also stated that the agency fee was
subject to increase at any time without further notice.
Shortly after the union sent out its notice, the California governor announced a
special election where voters would consider a number of propositions aimed at
state-level structural reform, with two propositions potentially having significant
impact on public-sector unions. After the announcement, Local 1000, as well as
other public-sector unions, immediately took action to raise money to defeat the
propositions and help achieve their political objectives.
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On August 31, SEIU sent out a letter addressed to “Local 1000 Members and Fair
Share Employees,” stating that fees would temporarily be raised from 1 percent of
gross monthly salary to 1.25 percent and that a $45-per-month cap on regular dues
would not apply. The letter explicitly stated that the increased dues would be used
to fund the union’s political activities. Initially, non-members had no ability to
object to paying the assessment. After some non-members complained about the
increase, SEIU informed the non-members that those who had previously objected
to the notice in June would only have to pay 56.35 percent of the special
assessment. A class of non-members responded by filing suit against Local 1000,
alleging that they were being forced to contribute to the Union’s political activities
in violation of the First Amendment.
The Court first addressed the Union’s argument that the case was moot because
Local 1000 agreed to refund the money collected from non-members after the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court rejected this argument, holding that
the non-members who filed suit still had an interest in the case and, if the
controversy was not resolved by the Court, nothing would prevent the union from
collecting such assessments in the future.
The Court then examined Local 1000’s collection of the special assessment,
holding that it violated the non-members’ rights under the First Amendment. The
Court noted the “primary purpose” of allowing unions to collect fees from nonmembers is to prevent non-members from free-riding on the union’s
efforts. However, free-rider arguments are unable to overcome First Amendment
objections. Unions do not have a constitutional entitlement to collect fees from
non-members and non-members’ First Amendment rights cannot be violated
through the collection process. The Court also noted that the general rule that
individuals should not be compelled to subsidize private groups or private speech
must prevail.
Taking all of this into account, the Court ruled that when a public-sector union
imposes a special assessment or mid-year dues increase, the Union must provide
an additional notice. Further, non-members must affirmatively consent to pay
such special assessments or dues increases; it is improper to require non-members
to opt-out or object in order to avoid paying increases. The majority further noted
in a footnote that the opt-in requirement was only for these limited situations and
the Court was not changing the procedures required under Hudson for collection
of regular dues.

